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The tripling of oil prices 
from early 2007 to   
mid-2008 is consistent 
with several market   
fundamentals,   
including increased 
demand from emerging 
markets, low elasticities 
of demand and reduced 
OPEC excess capacity.
  Oil market speculation became an especially popular topic when the 
price of crude tripled over 18 months to a record high $145 per barrel 
in July 2008. Of particular interest to many is whether speculators drove 
oil prices beyond what fundamentals would have otherwise justified. We 
explore this issue over two Economic Letters. In this article, we look at evi-
dence from the physical market for oil and conclude that fundamentals, 
and not speculation, were behind the dramatic rise and fall in oil prices. In 
our companion Economic Letter, we examine the futures market.
 
O 
il prices began their climb in 2002, reaching a record high in 
mid-2008, and then collapsed at the end of ’08 amid the global 
recession. As world economic growth picked up, so did oil prices. Overall, 
the year-over-year change in oil prices has fairly closely tracked world 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth (Chart 1). 
Energy consumption increases as GDP rises; but energy consumption 
in developing countries increases almost twice as fast as in developed 
countries. GDP expansion in emerging economies was particularly strong 
between 2005 and 2007, averaging 8 percent per year. Real GDP in China, 
for example, grew by an average 12.7 percent annually between 2005 and 
2007, while the nation’s oil consumption increased 5.1 percent annually 
during the period.
From the beginning of 2007 to mid-2008, weekly prices for West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) crude oil jumped 152 percent, from $57 to $143 per 
barrel. It’s possible that growing demand for crude oil might not be the 
reason for the rise. However, if the increase was due to other factors, oil 
consumption should have begun falling in response to the higher prices. 
Instead, there was almost no consumption decline during the period, 
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implying that oil prices were driven by 
growing world income and demand. 
Insensitivity to Price Change
Consumers of oil and oil products are 
not very sensitive to price changes, 
especially in the short run. In eco-
nomic jargon, the price elasticity of 
demand is very low. This is mainly 
because oil’s use for transportation 
purposes accounts for two-thirds of 
consumption, especially in developed 
countries, where there are no close 
substitutes in the short term. When 
consumers are insensitive to price 
changes, a shock in the oil market, 
whether from increased demand or 
reduced supply, will heighten price 
volatility. 
To see whether rising oil prices 
from 2007 through mid-2008 are 
compatible with the elasticities for oil 
estimated in the energy economics 
literature, we performed a simple cal-
culation. Taking the developed-world 
and emerging market GDP growth 
rates from the International Monetary 
Fund, and making some assumptions 
about income elasticities of demand, 
we can calculate the higher oil demand 
implied by these growth rates. Then, 
by comparing actual growth in con-
sumption and the calculated consump-
tion numbers, we can determine the 
oil price elasticities they imply. We 
found that these elasticities would 
have to range from 0.01 to 0.08 for 
prices to surge as they did in 2007 and 
2008—well within the estimated elas-
ticity ranges in the energy economics 
literature.1
OPEC Market Power Firmed Prices
The oil market is not perfectly 
competitive. The Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), since its formation in 1970, 
has been an oligopolistic producer, 
trying to boost prices by controlling 
members’ output (with more success 
at times of higher demand growth). 
The remaining non-OPEC producers 
form a price-taking, competitive fringe. 
OPEC’s market share has dwindled 
from 52 percent in the early 1970s to 
a still hefty 42 percent today. In the 
1990s, as the market grew, so did 
both OPEC and non-OPEC produc-
tion. However, non-OPEC oil output 
growth flattened around 2003, while 
OPEC output continued expanding 
from 37 percent in 2003 to the current 
42 percent level. Increased market 
power, coupled with rising demand, 
was a significant factor keeping oil 
prices high.  
Chart 1
World GDP Mirrors Oil Price Growth






















Real oil price growth
SOURCES: International Monetary Fund; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Wall Street Journal.
Chart 2
Reduced OPEC Excess Capacity Helped Tighten Market























NOTE: Oil prices are monthly averages.
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Low OPEC Excess Capacity 
OPEC’s crude oil production 
capacity has changed little since the 
1970s, rising from 34 million barrels 
per day in 1973 to 35.5 million barrels 
per day in 2008. However, increased 
world consumption greatly diminished 
the cartel’s excess capacity. OPEC 
has added capacity slowly, using its 
restrained output to keep prices high.
It is easier to keep cartel mem-
bers disciplined and conforming to 
production quotas when capacity is 
tight. Moreover, shocks in a tight oil 
market can increase price volatility 
because OPEC lacks the ability to off-
set these shocks, even if it desires to. 
Chart 2 shows the inverse relationship 
of oil prices and the cartel’s excess 
capacity. In mid-2008, when oil prices 
reached record highs, OPEC excess 
capacity was down to 1 million barrels 
per day.2
Inventories Did Not Increase
A speculator wanting to drive up 
the current price of oil would have to 
buy in the spot market. Since the price 
is determined in a cash marketplace 
where transactions are settled with 
physical oil changing hands, specula-
tive buyers would have to store their 
purchases, and inventories would rise. 
Instead, during the oil price run-up in 
2007 and 2008, inventories in the U.S. 
were being depleted. Chart 3 shows 
WTI prices and U.S. oil inventories 
and illustrates the workings of an effi-
cient market—as supplies diminish, 
prices rise and the market tightens. 
Another possibility might be 
speculators using floating storage, 
keeping oil in tankers at sea and off 
the market. Floating storage appears 
to increase in 2008, rising from 68.4 
million barrels at the end of March to 
97 million barrels in May (Chart 4). 
However, floating storage declined in 
June and continued falling throughout 
the summer. 
We would have expected to see 
floating storage rise significantly dur-
ing the summer if speculators were 
in the market; instead, the opposite 
occurred. Floating storage did rise 
much later in the year, but that was 
concurrent with the global recession. 
There is one additional type of 
storage—producers maintaining the 
oil as reserves and not producing. 
However, if we look at OPEC output, 
it clearly rose as oil prices went up, 
until July 2008. OPEC increased pro-
duction by 2.4 million barrels per day 
Chart 3
Oil Price Speculation? Inventories Didn’t Rise
Millions of barrels                                                                                                                                             Dollars per barrel
NOTE: Oil prices are monthly averages.
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1 An elasticity of 0.01 implies that for every 10 
percent change in oil prices, consumption falls by 
0.1 percent. Estimated short-run price elasticities 
for oil range from 0.0 to –0.11. See “A Literature 
Review of Demand Studies in World Oil Markets,” 
by Frank J. Atkins and S.M. Tayyebi Jazayeri, 
University of Calgary, Department of Economics 
Discussion Paper 2004-07, April 2004.
2 OPEC excess capacity has ranged from a high 
of 9.8 million barrels per day in 1985 to a low of 
700,000 barrels per day in 2004.
3 See “Did Speculation Drive Oil Prices? Futures 
Market Points to Fundamentals,” by Michael D. 
Plante and Mine K. Yücel, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas Economic Letter, vol. 6, no. 10, 2011. 
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from the beginning of 2007 to July 
2008. Non-OPEC production remained 
relatively constant and did not rise, 
though this is largely a function of 
non-OPEC producers’ zero excess 
capacity rather than an attempt to 
restrict output.
Other Commodities Surged
Those believing speculation 
pushed up prices point to the coin-
cident increase in the number of 
noncommercial traders in the futures 
market—for example, speculators—
and the rise in oil prices.3 However, 
Chart 5 shows that this may not neces-
sarily be the case. It depicts the prices 
of WTI, Illinois Basin coal, tallow and 
cobalt. Of these commodities, there 
is a futures market only for WTI. Yet, 
prices for Illinois Basin coal, tallow 
and cobalt increased as fast as oil, 
if not faster, in 2008 and fell just as 
quickly when the economy crumbled. 
Such integrated movement in the pric-
es of these commodities is consistent 
with a pure demand story, rather than 
a speculation one. 
Fundamentals, Not Speculation 
Activity in the futures market 
increased appreciably in the past 
decade, as did the number of noncom-
mercial traders. This rise was coinci-
dent with the rise in oil prices, leading 
some to hypothesize that speculation—
rather than market fundamentals—
drove the price of oil. 
The tripling of oil prices from ear-
ly 2007 to mid-2008 is consistent with 
several market fundamentals, includ-
ing increased demand from emerging 
markets, low elasticities of demand 
and reduced OPEC excess capacity. 
The behavior of inventories was also 
consistent with the reality of a tight 
market, not with a story of specula-
tion-driven hoarding, whether we look 
at inventories above ground, below 
ground or floating at sea. Hence, evi-
dence from the physical market for oil, 
similar to that from the futures market, 
is consistent with oil-market funda-
mentals leading to increasing oil prices 
before the global recession.
Plante is a research economist and Yücel is a 
senior economist and vice president at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Chart 5
WTI Prices Resemble Commodities Without Futures 
Markets
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